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Different pieces of evidence are about different things. Some of our evidence is about coins, and 
some of our evidence is about dinosaurs. It is natural to think that there is some interesting 
connection between facts about what a piece of evidence is about, evidential aboutness, and facts 
about how that piece of evidence bears on various hypotheses, evidential relevance. Here are a 
couple of examples. Suppose that I am about to roll a pair of dice. Any evidence that is entirely 
about how the first die will land seems to be evidentially irrelevant to how the second die will land. 
After all, the two dice are independent of one another. Now consider a more philosophical 
example, the Ravens paradox. Intuitively, the fact that this shoe is white seems to be evidentially 
irrelevant to the claim that all ravens are black. After all, the fact that this shoe is white is not at 
all about ravens. Of course, there may well be good reason to resist this intuitive verdict. At this 
point, these examples merely serve to illustrate a certain phenomenon.1 
Whatever the connection is between evidential aboutness and evidential relevance, it seems 
obvious that it should respect the following platitude about evidence: 
Evidential Equivalence: If one is (rationally) certain that E1 is true iff E2 is true, then for 
any H, it is rationally required that Cr(H | E1) = Cr(H | E2).2 
In other words, even E1 and E2 differ over what they are about, they should surely have the same 
evidential relevance towards H if one is rationally certain that they are either both true or both 
false.3 
The purpose of this paper is to present a paradox that seems to cast some doubt on Evidential 
Equivalence, by exploiting certain fine-grained features of evidential aboutness. While I ultimately 
wish to retain Evidential Equivalence, I believe the paradox shows that our intuitive conceptions 
of inadmissible evidence and independent evidence are sensitive to facts about evidential 
aboutness in an interesting way.   
                                                          
1 For a book-length treatment of the phenomenon of aboutness and its connections to several other 
notions, see Yablo (2014). For a recent assessment of different theories of aboutness, see Hawke (2018). 
2 Throughout, I will write Cr(H) for an agent’s unconditional credence that H is true and Cr(H | E) for an 
agent’s conditional credence that H is true given E. 
3 Krämer (2017) also discusses the relation between evidential aboutness and evidential relevance, but he 
does not question Evidential Equivalence. 
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In §§1 and 2, I analyze two cases and argue that we ought to have a particular conditional credence 
in those cases, and in §3 I show why these conditional credences violate Evidential Equivalence. 
In §4, I respond to some natural worries about the case, and in §§5 and 6 I give some independent 
motivations for and against Evidential Equivalence. 
 
1. Finite Coins 
Consider the following case: 
Finite Coins: Suppose you are in a room with a countable infinity of people, and each of 
you flips a coin without looking at the result. You know that all of the coin flips are fair 
and independent. I then inform you that something remarkable happened: almost every coin 
landed tails. More precisely, only finitely many coins landed heads. Now what should your 
credence be that your coin landed heads? 
It seems like your credence should drop from 1/2. Given that almost every coin landed tails, what’s 
the chance that you are one of the vanishingly few heads-flippers? After all, the evidence that 
almost every coin landed tails should at least count as some evidence that you are one of the tail-
flippers. Analogously, if you have a ticket for a lottery where almost every ticket is a losing ticket 
(analogously, almost every coin is a tails-coin), then if the lottery is fair (if every coin is equally 
likely to be one of the heads-coins), then you should think you probably have a losing ticket (you 
probably have a tails-coin). Here are some more formal arguments for the stronger conclusion that 
you should in fact lower your credence to 0.4 
First, there is an accuracy argument. For every agent A in the room, let HA be the proposition that 
agent A flipped heads, and suppose you wanted to minimize your inaccuracy with respect to each 
HA. On standard measures of inaccuracy, such as the Brier score5, if you stick with 1/2 for each 
HA upon being informed that only finitely many agents flipped heads, you will accrue an equal 
finite amount of inaccuracy for each HA.6 Since there are infinitely many agents in total, you will 
expect to accrue an infinite amount of inaccuracy.7 However, suppose you drop your credence to 
                                                          
4 One might instead want to assign some infinitesimal probability rather than 0. This is fine – all of the 
arguments in this paper will go through if one replaces ‘0’ with some infinitesimal quantity. Strictly 
speaking, I will only need the claim that one’s credence should be lower than 1/2 in §3. However, for 
general arguments against the use of infinitesimals, see Easwaran (2014). 
5 For much more on measures of inaccuracy and their justifications, see Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010). 
6 I am assuming here (and in some of the other arguments below) that one should assign equal credence to 
to each HA by symmetry considerations. The evidence that only finitely many coins landed tails is entirely 
neutral on which coins were tails and which coins were heads.  
7 For example, on the Brier score, your inaccuracy for each HA will be (1-1/2)2 = (0-1/2)2 = 1/4. It is also 
worth noting that assigning any non-zero credence c to each of the HA will result in one having an infinite  
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0 for each HA. Then, you will accrue no inaccuracy for all the tail-flippers, and you will accrue 
some equal finite amount of inaccuracy for each head-flipper. Since there are only finitely many 
head-flippers, you know you will only have a finite amount of inaccuracy. Having a finite amount 
of inaccuracy is better than having an infinite amount, so you should drop to 0 in each HA rather 
than sticking to 1/2 in each HA. 
Second, there is a Dutch book argument. Suppose you stick to 1/2 for each HA. Then, there will be 
a series of Dutch books, each of which is strictly favorable to you, for which you are guaranteed 
to lose an infinite amount of money.8 For each agent A, you would agree to receive $2 if A flips 
heads and pay $1 if A flips tails. No matter what happens, you will lose an infinite amount of 
money. In contrast, if you drop to 0 for each HA, there will be no Dutch book against you with 
respect to the HA. First, note that for a bet on HA to be strictly favorable to you it must be of the 
following form: pay $X if A flips heads and receive $Y if A flips tails, where X is any real number 
and Y is any positive real number. No collection of bets of this form will guarantee a loss, since 
you might win all the bets if all of the agents flip tails.9,10 
Third, consider what you should do if you were instead informed that exactly n coins landed heads 
for some fixed constant n. If there were n*m people in the room in total, your credence should go 
to 1/m. So, in the limit as m goes to infinity and the number of people in the room increase, your 
credence should limit to 0. So, I claim that if there were countably many people in the room who 
flipped fair coins, and you were informed that exactly n coins landed heads, your credence that 
your coin landed heads ought to drop to 0. For suppose you did not align your credence to the 
limiting value of 0, and instead you set your credence to c>0 in the infinite case. Then, there will 
be some number M such that 1/M < c. So this means that, if there were n*M total people in the 
room and n people flipped heads, your credence that your coin landed heads would be higher than 
if there were infinitely many total people in the room! Surely that can’t be right. So, if there were 
countably many people in the room who flipped fair coins and n people flipped heads, your 
credence that your coin landed heads ought to drop to 0. So, in the original case, upon being 
informed that finitely many coins landed heads, you know that for some n, there are exactly n 
people who flipped heads. You also know that no matter what the value of n is, conditional on its 
                                                          
amount of inaccuracy. For each tail-flipper A, your inaccuracy in HA will be (0-c)2=c2. Since there are 
infinitely many tail-flippers, one will accrue an infinite amount of inaccuracy. 
8 It has been argued persuasively by Easwaran (2013) that Dutch books in infinitary cases should consist 
of individual bets that are strictly favorable.  
9 As with footnote 7, it should be noted that assigning any fixed non-zero credence to each of the HA is 
vulnerable to this Dutch Book Argument. 
10 It is worth noting that the Dutch book considered here has several good-making features that might 
ward off some skepticism about infinitary Dutch books. First, it is a synchronic Dutch book. Second, 
every bet is uniformly bounded above and below. Third, there is no possibility that an infinite amount of 
money is both gained and lost because of this Dutch book. 
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true value, you ought to drop to 0. Therefore, it seems that you ought to drop to 0 merely upon 
being informed that finitely many coins landed heads.11 
This argument goes hand in hand with a reflection argument and an argument from deferring to 
epistemic experts. For the reflection argument, suppose that, after you are told that only finitely 
many coins landed heads, an announcer says that he will say the exact number of head-flippers in 
30 seconds. You know that, no matter what he says, your credence should drop to 0. So why bother 
waiting? For the deference argument, suppose you know that the announcer told Bob the exact 
number of head-flippers in the room. Suppose you also know Bob is a perfectly rational agent who 
has all the evidence you have. You therefore know that Bob’s credence that your coin landed heads 
is 0, and you know that he is a rational agent who has strictly more relevant evidence than you do, 
so you should have the same credence as him. Intuitively, however, the addition of the announcer 
and Bob is irrelevant. Whatever your credence should be in the original case, it should be the same 
in the modified cases with the announcer and Bob. 
 
2. Finite Coins* 
Next, consider the following variant of the case: 
Finite Coins*:  Again, you are in a room with countably many people and each of you flips 
a coin without looking at the result. You know that all of the coin flips are fair and 
independent. This time, you will only be told information about the other people in the 
room, excluding you. Let S be the set of these other people. I inform you of the following 
remarkable piece of information: only finitely many people in S flipped heads. What should 
your credence be that your coin landed heads? 
The answer to Finite Coins* seems obvious: you should clearly stay at 1/2! The piece of 
information you received has nothing to do with your coin, since (it is stipulated that) you are 
certain that each flip is independent of any other. Because of this, your rational credence in the 
                                                          
11 The last step appeals to countable conglomerability. Formulated as a rational constraint, countable 
conglomerability is the thesis that for any countable partition of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events 
E1, E2, E3, …, if c1 ≤ Cr(P | Ei) ≤ c2 for all i, then it is rationally required that c1 ≤ Cr(P) ≤ c2. Some people 
deny the general thesis of countable conglomerability. In response, I have three points. First, neither the 
intuitive argument in terms of the lottery-analogy, nor the accuracy argument, nor the Dutch book 
argument explicitly appeal to countable conglomerability as a premise. Second, even if one denies the 
general principle of countable conglomerability, one might still want to retain this particular instance of it. 
Third, the purpose of this section is to present the strongest case in favor of lowering one’s credence from 
1/2. While some deny the general thesis of countable conglomerability, many endorse it. In the next 
paragraph, I will intuitively motivate countable conglomerability in the standard way.  
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proposition that your coin landed heads should not change upon learning that only finitely many 
people in S flipped heads. 
Consider the following modified case: 
Past Coins: This time, you are alone in a room holding a fair coin that you have yet to flip. 
Before you flip your fair coin, someone informs you of the following fact: last year, there 
was once a time where countably many people in this same room all flipped coins, and, 
remarkably, only finitely many of them landed heads. After receiving this curious bit of 
information about the past events in the room, what should your credence be that the fair 
coin you haven’t even flipped yet will land heads? 
The answer seems clear – your credence should be 1/2. This follows from the Principal Principle. 
You should conform your credence to the objective chance of 1/2 that your unflipped fair coin will 
land Heads. Could one resist this conclusion by claiming that the evidence you received about the 
events that transpired last year counts as ‘inadmissible’ information? Given that the evidence you 
received was entirely about events in the past (and did not involve any exotic information about 
time travelers or crystal balls), this suggestion is implausible. Could one think that Past Coins 
should be treated differently than Finite Coins*? It’s hard to see how the mere temporal distance 
between your flip and the other people’s flips could be relevant. Surely it shouldn’t be relevant if 
the other people flipped 1 minute earlier than you, rather than 1 year earlier than you. It’s hard to 
believe that there’s a crucial difference if the flips happened simultaneously with yours (as in Finite 
Coins*), rather than slightly before. 
One potential asymmetry in the two cases is that in Past Coins you are given a particular qualitative 
property, namely being temporally separated from all other coin-tossings, which singles out your 
coin-toss from the others, but you are given no such qualitative property in Finite Coins*. One 
might then worry that Finite Coins* (and Finite Coins) involves ‘essentially indexical’ or ‘self-
locating’ propositions. While I am skeptical that such a difference should matter, for my purposes 
we can simply side-step this issue by stipulating that you do have a qualitative way of picking 
yourself out among the coin-flippers in Finite Coins* (and Finite Coins). Perhaps, for example, 
you are certain that you are the only person in the room wearing a red shirt. The proposition in 
question, that you flipped heads, will then be equivalent to the purely qualitative proposition that 
the red-shirted person flipped heads.12 Adding this extra stipulation to the description of Finite 
Coins and Finite Coins* does not, as far as I can see, affect the intuitive verdicts about these cases. 
                                                          
12 Dorr (2010) presents an interesting case in which he argues that one’s credence that a certain future 
coin toss will be Heads should be 1, conditional on the outcomes of certain past coin tosses. Dorr’s 
puzzle, however, does seem to essentially involve certain qualitative temporal symmetries and self-
locating propositions. For his case, Dorr suggests that the application of the Principal Principle might 
need to be restricted to apply only to propositions with certain ‘modes of presentation’. However, Dorr 
says, ‘Nothing I have said generates any obvious worry about the Principal Principle as applied to purely 
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3. The Paradox 
Let E1 be the original piece of evidence that finitely many people in total flipped heads. Let us 
generalize the second piece of evidence. Let E2,A say that, excluding agent A, finitely many people 
in the room flipped heads. Note that for every agent A, E1 is known to be necessarily equivalent to 
E2,A. In other words, necessarily, finitely many people in total flipped heads if and only if finitely 
many people, excluding A, flipped heads. 
Let Cr stand for the credence function you ought to have. The following three propositions form 
an inconsistent triad: 
(1) For some A, Cr(HA | E1) < 1/2 
(2) For every A, Cr(HA | E2,A) = 1/2 
(3) For every A, Cr(HA | E1) = Cr(HA | E2,A) 
Note that I have argued for a much stronger version of proposition 1 in §1, namely that for all A, 
Cr(HA | E1) = 0. However, the much weaker version of the proposition suffices to generate the 
contradiction. Proposition 3 is simply an instance of Evidential Equivalence. 
 
4. Infinitary Worries 
In this section, I will respond to three natural infinitary worries. 
First, one might worry that the coins can’t be ‘fair’ given that almost all of them landed tails. This 
might be a valid worry if one had some sort of frequentist view of chances on which what it is for 
a coin to have a 50-50 chance of coming up heads just is for the actual (or hypothetical) frequencies 
of certain coin flips (relative to a certain reference class) to have a limiting frequency of 50-50. 
However, frequentist views of chance are widely considered to be implausible. For a total of 30 
arguments against frequentist views of chance, see Hájek (1996, 2009). 
Second, one might worry that all of the conditional credences in the inconsistent triad above should 
just be ‘undefined’ since according to the Ratio Formula, Cr(A | B) = Cr(A ∧ B)/Cr(B). In our 
case, we are conditioning on a proposition that has probability 0, since Cr(E1) = Cr(E2,A) = 0, so 
applying the ratio formula to Cr(H | E1) and Cr(H | E2,A) does not give us a well-defined result.13 
                                                          
qualitative propositions…’ (p. 202). The puzzle I will be focusing on can be run on purely qualitative 
propositions. 
13 An interesting question arises about whether one can construct a similar case against Evidential 
Equivalence that doesn’t rely on the evidence having probability 0. In other words, can one find examples 
of H, E1, and E2 such that one is certain that E1 is true iff E2 is true, and Cr(E1) = Cr(E2) > 0, yet Cr(H | E1) 
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In response, it should be noted that many presentations of the Ratio Formula explicitly have a 
clause that the formula is only valid when Cr(B) ≠ 0. Many authors have argued that the Ratio 
Formula is simply silent in cases where Cr(B) = 0. Hájek (2003) has argued at length that the 
concept of conditional credence is at least as fundamental as that of unconditional credence, and 
the Ratio Formula should not be treated as a definition of conditional credence, but rather as a 
thesis about conditional credence that is only valid in certain unproblematic cases (such as when 
Cr(B) is not 0). Hájek argues for an account on which conditional probability is a primitive two-
place function not defined in terms of unconditional probability at all. Unconditional probabilities 
are then defined as conditional probabilities conditional on the tautology. This sort of primitivist 
account is also described in Popper (1955) and Rényi (1970). Even bracketing this sort of account, 
it just seems clear that probabilities conditional on possible probability 0 events can be made 
perfect sense of. What’s the probability I will flip infinitely many heads, conditional on me flipping 
infinitely many heads? Obviously 1! What’s the probability I will only flip finitely many heads, 
conditional on me flipping infinitely many heads? Obviously 0! What’s the probability that I will 
roll a ‘6’ with a fair die, conditional on Bob flipping infinitely many heads? Obviously 1/6! Here’s 
a less trivial example. Suppose I flip a coin infinitely many times. Conditional on my infinite string 
of coins landing either HHHHHHHH…. or TTTTTTTTTT…. or HTHTHTHTHTHT…., what 
should my credence be that my second toss was tails? It should be 2/3, since any infinite string is 
as likely as any other and in two out of the three possible strings my second toss is heads. These 
examples show that there are rational requirements on conditional credences where the condition 
is assigned probability 0. The three propositions in the inconsistent triad above are just claims 
about what some of these rational requirements are. 
Third, one might worry that as finite agents we can never actually learn or update on a probability 
0 event. For example, we might be told that only finitely many coins landed heads, but we would 
just suspect that that was a lie. In response, it should be noted that the inconsistent triad above is 
entirely in terms of conditional probabilities. Even if it is in principle impossible to update on a 
probability 0 event (which is very contentious), I do not need to assume that it is possible to run 
the paradox.14 
Given these three points, what are the prospects for a view that denies all three propositions in the 
inconsistent triad by saying that all credences conditional on zero-probability propositions 
(henceforth, ‘null-probabilities’) are ‘ill-defined’? I see three problems with such a view. First, it 
                                                          
is intuitively different than Cr(H | E2)? I’m not sure if such intuitive examples exist. However, if such a 
case does exist, it will run afoul of the Ratio Formula. Given the Ratio Formula, Cr(H | E1) = Cr(H ∧ E1) / 
Cr(E1), and Cr(H | E2) = Cr(H ∧ E2)/Cr(E2). These two values will be equal since Cr(H ∧ E1) = Cr(H ∧ E2) 
and Cr(E1) = Cr(E2) (given that one is certain that E1 is true iff E2 is true (and hence H ∧ E1 is true iff H ∧ 
E2 is true). 
14 It should be noted, however, that two of the arguments in support of proposition 1, namely the 
reflection and deference arguments, do implicitly assume that it is at least in principle possible to update 
on such propositions. 
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seems like many null-probabilities are entirely unproblematic. Surely it is a rational requirement 
that Cr(A | A) = 1, given that A is any contingent proposition compatible with one’s evidence. 
Second, it seems that scientific practice is committed to some null-probabilities. As Myrvold 
(2015) notes, it seems that we have to regard some null-probabilities as well-defined in order to 
do justice to statistical practice. Statistical practice uses likelihood functions that assign well-
defined null-probabilities to data conditional on particular (probability zero) point values of some 
continuously varying parameter. Third, as Dorr (2010) argues, it seems that we need well-defined 
null-probabilities to give a satisfactory account of objective chance. Null-probabilities are needed 
to express how the chances at earlier times evolve into the chances at later times. The chance 
function at some later time t2 is just the chance function at some earlier time t1 conditional on the 
complete truth about history between t1 and t2, whose chance at t1 may well be 0. For these reasons, 
I regard the position that all null-probabilities are simply ‘ill-defined’ as far too radical.15 
 
5. Hyperintensional Evidence 
 So far, I have only argued in favor of the first two propositions in the inconsistent triad above. In 
order to put the case against Evidential Equivalence in its strongest light, I would like to briefly 
give some independent, positive motivation for getting out of the paradox by rejecting proposition 
3, and hence rejecting Evidential Equivalence. One way to reject Evidential Equivalence is to think 
that Bayesians should treat evidence hyperintensionally – by making important epistemic 
distinctions among necessarily equivalent pieces of evidence. Why think that evidence is 
hyperintensional? Because aboutness is hyperintensional, and it is natural to think that facts about 
evidential relevance are sensitive to what the evidence is about. In the inconsistent triad above, E1 
is evidentially relevant to the state of everyone’s coin since it is partially about everyone’s coin. 
On the other hand, E2,A is not evidentially relevant to the state of A’s coin since it is not even about 
A’s coin. I believe that the strong intuitions pulling us in opposite directions in the inconsistent 
triad are entirely due to the hyperintensionality of aboutness. 
The cases of Finite Coins and Finite Coins* motivate the thought that certain central concepts in 
Bayesian epistemology, namely independence and inadmissibility, are intuitively 
                                                          
15 Both Easwaran (2008) and Myrvold (2015) argue for a view according to which null-probabilities have 
to be further relativized to some contextually salient partition to have a well-defined answer. The partition 
is then used to specify how to compute the null-probabilities as a certain limit of unconditional 
probabilities. On this view, perhaps proposition 1 is true relativized to one partition, proposition 2 is true 
relativized to a distinct partition, but proposition 3 is false according to either partition. This is an 
interesting and controversial view which can’t be fully assessed here. The view does go against the 
orthodox view that conditional probability must be an absolute rather than a relativized notion. For 
example, Kadane et al (1986) say, ‘This approach is unacceptable from the point of view of the 
statistician who, when given the information that [some event] has occurred, must determine the 




hyperintensional. Intuitively, we want to say that evidence that is entirely about the outcomes of 
distinct coin tosses should be regarded as independent of your own coin toss. This has the 
consequence that the evidence received in Finite Coins* should be regarded as probabilistically 
independent of your own coin toss, while the evidence received in Finite Coins need not be 
regarded as probabilistically independent. 
Next, turn to the concept of inadmissibility. Recall the following formulation of the Principal 
Principle given by Lewis (1980): 
Principal Principle: Let C be any reasonable initial credence function. Let t be any time. 
Let x be any real number in the unit interval. Let X be the proposition that the chance, at 
time t, of A's holding equals x. Let E be any proposition compatible with X that is 
admissible at time t. Then C(A | X ∧ E) = x. 
Different understandings of ‘admissible’ lead to different versions of the Principal Principle. Lewis 
gives us the following sufficient condition for admissibility: ‘if a proposition is entirely about 
matters of particular fact at times no later than t, then as a rule that proposition is admissible at t’ 
(p. 272). Note the crucial word ‘about’. We can bring out the hyperintensionality of ‘about matters 
of particular fact at times no later than t’ by using the case of Past Coins in §2. The information 
that you received in that case, namely that last year countably many people flipped coins in your 
room and only finitely many coins landed heads, is ‘entirely about matters of particular fact’ in the 
past. So, it should count as admissible with respect to the chance of the proposition that your coin 
will land heads. However, if we let S be the set of all coins flipped at that time together with your 
coin, the proposition that only finitely many of the coins in S landed heads does not seem to be 
‘entirely about matters of particular fact’ in the past, even though it is equivalent to the information 
that you received in Past Coins. 
In sum, one might try to independently motivate the rejection of Evidential Equivalence by 
reflecting on the fact that certain central concepts in Bayesian epistemology, namely independence 
and inadmissibility, are intuitively hyperintensional. 
 
6. Evidential Equivalence 
Given the above considerations, one might think that the right way to respond to the paradox is 
simply to deny proposition 3 by denying Evidential Equivalence. However, rejecting Evidential 
Equivalence comes at a very serious cost, and it perhaps raises many more questions than it 
answers. This should not be too surprising, given that Evidential Equivalence is more or less built 
into the foundations of Bayesian epistemology. In closing, I will briefly state three initial worries 
for the denier of Evidential Equivalence. 
10 
 
First, there are nearby cases where it is not at all clear what the denier of Evidential Equivalence 
should say. For example, what should Cr(HA | E1 ∨ E2,A) be? Should it be 0 or 1/2? Furthermore, 
what should my credence in HA be if I first updated on E1 and then update on E2,A? Would this 
change if I first updated on E2,A and then updated on E1? Is the commutativity of conditionalization 
violated? There is also the general worry that rational agents shouldn’t have to wait to be ‘told’ 
the second piece of information, since they can immediately infer the second piece of information 
from the first. 
Second, one will need a hyperintensional account of the objects of credence. On one standard view, 
the objects of credence are something like sets of possibilities, where the possibilities are either 
epistemic or metaphysical possibilities.16 Since E1 and E2,A describe the same set of possibilities, 
any account like this will entail proposition 3. One natural thought is that the objects of credences 
should be something like sentences, since there are clearly hyperintensional distinctions between 
necessarily equivalent sentences. If this sort of account is adopted, one must decide whether the 
sentences should come from some natural language or some highly idealized language. Another 
account is the one defended by Braun (2016), in which the objects of credence are Russellian 
propositions which are composed from the individuals and properties that one’s belief is about. 
This will have the consequence that E1 and E2,A are distinct objects of credence since the first is 
partially about A and the second is not. Lastly, one might try to adopt the formal framework in 
Fine’s (2017) truthmaker semantics by letting the objects of credence be sets of ‘states’ as opposed 
to sets of worlds. Fine’s framework is explicitly hyperintensional, and it accommodates the 
phenomenon of aboutness particularly well (p. 569-71). 
Third, Evidential Equivalence can be derived from central principles about conditional 
probability.17 So, if Evidential Equivalence is denied, then certain central principles about 
conditional probability will also have to go. The proof uses the following axiom of conditional 
probability, which is present in the axiomatizations of primitive conditional probability found in 
Popper (1955) and Rényi (1970): 
Multiplicative Axiom (MA): Cr(A ∧ B | C) = Cr(A | B ∧ C)Cr(B | C) 
Suppose that one is certain that E1 is true iff E2 is true, as per Evidential Equivalence. Then, one 
should set Cr(E1 | E2) = 1 = Cr(E2 | E1). By MA, Cr(H ∧ E2 | E1) = Cr(H | E2 ∧ E1)Cr(E2 | E1) = 
Cr(H | E2 ∧ E1). Similarly, by MA, Cr(H ∧ E1 | E2) = Cr(H | E1 ∧ E2)Cr(E1 | E2) = Cr(H | E1 ∧ E2). 
So, since Cr(H | E2 ∧ E1) = Cr(H | E1 ∧ E2), it follows that Cr(H ∧ E2 | E1) = Cr(H ∧ E1 | E2).  
                                                          
16 For a defense of the view that the objects of credence are sets of epistemic possibilities, see Chalmers 
(2011). For a traditional defense of the view that the objects of credence are (centered) possible worlds, 
see Lewis (1986). 
17 Thanks to an anonymous referee for the following argument. 
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Next, note that Cr(H ∧ E2 | E1) = Cr(H | E1) + Cr(E2 | E1) - Cr(H ∨ E2 | E1), and since Cr(E2 | E1) = 
1 = Cr(H ∨ E2 | E1), we have that Cr(H ∧ E2 | E1) = Cr(H | E1). Exactly symmetric considerations 
imply that Cr(H ∧ E1 | E2) = Cr(H | E2). So, we have Cr(H | E1) = Cr(H ∧ E2 | E1) = Cr(H ∧ E1 | E2) 
= Cr(H | E2), as desired. Since each of the steps in this proof proceeded through central, 
uncontroversial principles governing conditional probability, rejecting Evidential Equivalence 
comes at a very steep cost. 
All this being said, it seems like every way out of our inconsistent triad comes at a very steep cost. 
In order to deny proposition 1, you would need to say that learning that almost everybody flipped 
tails is no evidence at all that you flipped tails. Moreover, you would need to choose to be more 
inaccurate, to expose yourself to dutch books, to ‘wait’ until an announcer tells you the exact 
number of head-flippers, and to refuse to defer to ideally rational epistemic experts. In order to 
deny proposition 2, you would need to accept the claim that evidence entirely about the outcomes 
of other coin tosses is somehow relevant to the outcome of your own coin toss, holding fixed that 
every coin toss is independent of every other one! Moreover, you would need to either find some 
disanalogy between Finite Coins* and Past Coins or have a bizarre account of ‘inadmissible’ 
evidence in Past Coins. Neither of these two options is particularly attractive.  
Whatever one ultimately decides to say about this paradox, I hope to have pointed out an 
interesting tension in the foundations of Bayesian Epistemology. While there are principled 
reasons why we should uphold Evidential Equivalence, there are also principled reasons for 
thinking that certain central concepts in Bayesian epistemology, namely independence and 
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